Servitizing manufacturers: The impact of service complexity and contractual and relational capabilities by Kreye, Melanie et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal  
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Dec 20, 2017
Servitizing manufacturers:  The impact of service complexity and contractual and
relational capabilities
Kreye, Melanie; Roehrich, Jens K. ; Lewis, Michael A.
Published in:
Production Planning & Control
Link to article, DOI:
10.1080/09537287.2015.1033489
Publication date:
2015
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Kreye, M., Roehrich, J. K., & Lewis, M. A. (2015). Servitizing manufacturers:  The impact of service complexity
and contractual and relational capabilities. Production Planning & Control, 26(14-15), 1233-1246. DOI:
10.1080/09537287.2015.1033489
 Servitizing manufacturers:  
The impact of service complexity and contractual and relational capabilities 
 
Melanie E. Kreyea,b,* ; Jens K. Roehrich a; and Michael A. Lewis a 
a School of Management, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, UK 
b Department of Management Engineering, Technical University of Denmark, 
Produktionstorvet, 2800 Lyngby, Denmark 
 
 
 
Submitted to Production Planning and Control - Special Issue on ‘Organisational 
transformation in servitization’;  
Editors: Sergio Cavalieri, Paolo Gaiardelli and Veronica Martinez 
 
 
*Author for correspondence.  
Melanie Kreye: Tel.: +44 (0) 1225 383 881; e-mail: M.Kreye@bath.ac.uk 
Jens Roehrich: Tel.: +44 (0) 1225 385 060; e-mail: J.Roehrich@bath.ac.uk 
Michael Lewis:  Tel.: +44 (0) 1225 386 536; e-mail: M.A.Lewis@bath.ac.uk 
 
1 
Servitizing manufacturers:  
The relationship between service complexity and contractual and relational capabilities 
 
Abstract:  
Processes of servitization will lead providers to change their service delivery 
structures but they also need to transform broader organisational attributes 
including contractual and relational capabilities. Based on case studies in the 
European healthcare sector, we investigate the influence of increasing levels of 
service complexity on this transformation. Our findings are potentially counter-
intuitive; suggesting that contractual capabilities do not increase with service 
complexity. Instead, we observed increased levels of relational capabilities; 
manifest in the visibility of the provider on the customer site, the number of 
‘non-requested’ site visits and increasingly informal information exchange. 
 
Keywords: Servitization, service complexity, product-service system, 
contractual and relational capabilities, multiple case studies 
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1. Introduction 
Many manufacturing companies evolve from a product-focused business orientation to a 
Product-Service System (PSS). Business models for PSS usually grow around the physical 
asset where the PSS provider offers the asset’s use or additional support (Tukker, 2004; 
Baines et al., 2009). Currently, most PSSs in industry focus on the latter option, i.e. the 
product is owned by the customer and the PSS provider ensures the performance and 
availability to add further value (Wise and Baumgartner, 1999; Gaiardelli et al., 2007). In 
other words, the PSS is often provided under conditions of asset specificity which locks the 
choice of PSS providers and their technical knowledge and skills necessary for the service 
provision. In these cases, the PSS offerings can be classified according to their level of 
service complexity as many PSS providers offer agreements of different levels of 
complicatedness and difficulty (Benedettini and Neely, 2012). Maintenance or after-sales 
services require less complexity with regard to the operational processes and the delivery 
system than performance-based services. Thus, it can be expected that the contractual and 
relational capabilities required to offer and receive PSSs differ depending on the level of 
service complexity. For example, Grundfos, a globally operating manufacturer of water 
pumps and pump systems, offer services ranging from basic support in terms of repair and 
exchange to improved reliability and performance of their equipment. Another example is 
Vestas, a manufacturer of wind turbines, who offers services of varying degrees of 
complexity ranging from spare parts to availability contracts guaranteeing the performance 
of their turbines. Both companies needed to build up strong working relationships, based on 
contracts and trust, to offer PSS offerings to its customer base.  
To support their service business, servitized manufacturers need to develop and 
implement appropriate capabilities to realise such a shift and to offer different levels of 
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service complexity. However, the majority of manufacturing companies who aim at 
following a servitization strategy fail in their attempts which can be due to missing or 
underdeveloped capabilities (Reinartz and Ulaga, 2008; Kreye et al., 2013). In particular, the 
development of contractual and relational capabilities is important for the success to meet 
new market conditions and realise emerging business opportunities (Martinez et al., 2010). 
Without appropriate contractual and relational capabilities, PPS solution providers are not 
able to write, interpret and manage complex contracts govern these integrated solutions. 
Moreover, without appropriate relational capabilities, organisations would not be able to 
co-create value with their customers when delivering and managing these PSS solutions. 
Building up strong inter-personal and inter-organisational relationships is vital in PSS 
settings and depend on the complexity of the service delivered in order to, for instance, 
increase information exchange, address occurring problems and disagreements in a speedy 
manner and to jointly realise innovation in product/service offerings. Contractual and 
relational capabilities are also important for managing the closer relationship between PSS 
provider and their customers to successfully deal with uncertainty, the risk of opportunism 
and jointly solve problems (Williamson, 1985; Kreye et al., 2014; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). 
Thus, PSS providers and their customers need to acquire the relevant resources, knowledge 
and skills to create value from PSS solutions. 
Current literature offers limited empirical insights into the issue of service 
complexity and relationship management in terms of contractual and relational capabilities 
for PSS providers and customers. More specifically, the following two issues remain under-
researched and are empirically addressed in this study. First, the majority of prior studies 
adopt a purely seller-based viewpoint investigating different aspects of delivering PSSs (e.g. 
Mathieu, 2001). Very limited research adopts a dyadic perspective incorporating buyer and 
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provider. However, as value of PSS offerings is created during their use (Vargo and Lusch, 
2008), it is the inter-organisational relationship between buyer and provider that plays a 
vital part in determining the benefits of integration. Second, prior studies do not distinguish 
between different levels of service complexity (notable exception Neely et al., 2011). As 
service complexity determines the operational processes necessary to deliver and receive 
accompanying services, it also influences the relationship between service provider and 
customer. Thus, the level of contractual and relational capabilities can be expected to vary 
depending on the level of service complexity. 
We address these limitations by positioning the following research question (RQ): How does 
service complexity impact (i) contractual capabilities and (ii) relational capabilities when 
providing and receiving PSSs? We investigate our RQs by presenting two case studies of one 
manufacturing company, which we call ‘PSS provider’ for confidentiality reasons, and its 
customers. The case studies focus on the European healthcare sector as this was an ideal 
context to investigate the influence of service complexity. The PSS provider had traditionally 
been a provider of complex engineering products and made deliberate steps to introduce 
servitization strategies, offering a variety of services with different levels of complexity. 
Gaining this in-depth understanding of a PSS provider offered the possibility to study the 
issue of contractual and relational capabilities in an organisational context to compare the 
influence of service complexity. Thus, we contribute to the literature in the field in two 
ways. First, the investigation of both PSS provider and customer offers insights into the 
service relationship from a dyadic perspective which helps to draw a more comprehensive 
picture of the PSS and relationship management. Second, we offer a theoretically-grounded 
and empirically-tested framework of service complexity in the context of servitization that 
will offer an in-depth understanding of characterising the different levels of service 
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complexity and their links to contractual and relational capabilities. This will form a 
guideline for industry and managers to strategically plan and develop their service offerings 
and the necessary contractual and relational capabilities (Cavalieri et al., 2007; Legnani et 
al., 2009). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Based on the literature in the 
field, we develop an initial conceptual framework relating service complexity to contractual 
and relational capabilities of a PSS provider and their customer (section 2). We then test this 
initial conceptual framework using two industrial case studies with different levels of service 
complexity. In section 3, we detail the research methodology before section 4 describes the 
empirical findings. In section 5, we discuss our findings before drawing conclusions and 
providing implications in section 6. 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Service complexity and servitization 
Servititzation, i.e. the shift towards providing and receiving PSSs, is typically undertaken 
gradually (Tukker, 2004; Smith et al., 2012). In other words, manufacturing companies 
provide support services with different degrees of service complexity (Batista et al., 2008). 
Complexity in the context of services can have varying definitions depending on their focus 
(Neely et al., 2011). Reviewing the literature in the field, Benedettini and Neely (2011; 2012) 
found that service complexity can be differentiated into complicatedness and difficulty. 
Complicatedness refers to the high number of components and their interrelation within the 
service provision. Difficulty is defined as the high amount of resources that are needed to 
achieve the intended outcome. In other words, a complicated service offers many different 
functions while a difficult service delivers sophisticated functions (Benedettini and Neely, 
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2012). However, this does not seem to be a distinct differentiation as a service that delivers 
sophisticated functions often also delivers many different functions. As such, complexity can 
be connected to the engineering system necessary to fulfill the requirements (Ng et al., 
2011) and the interaction between the service stakeholders (Tien, 2008). Complexity can 
further arise from the dynamic nature of services due to the ‘open’ nature of services, i.e. 
the constant adaptation to context and conditions (Badinelli et al., 2012). 
In this paper, we use a definition of complexity associated with the characteristic of 
the services. As such, we do not relate our understanding of service complexity to the 
amount and interaction of the people involved in the production and consumption of a 
service (Tien, 2008) or the dynamic change of the service to adapt to new situations and 
conditions (Badinelli et al., 2012). We agree that these are important aspects that can create 
complexity and need to be considered in a coherent understanding of this topic. However, 
the purpose of this paper is to draw the connection between service complexity and 
contractual and relational capabilities and thus we use service complexity to characterise 
the different agreements. As such, we utilise the definition of service complexity provided 
by Shostack who states that complexity is “the number and intricacy of the steps required to 
perform it” (1987: 35). This definition relates to the service system used in the literature (Ng 
et al., 2011; Badinelli et al., 2012) and seems to also incorporate both categories of service 
complexity presented by Benedettini and Neely (2011; 2012). It further highlights the 
activity-centered process of services (Gadrey, 2000). 
The assumption is that the path towards offering PSSs is connected to an increasing 
level of service complexity. The shift towards providing and buying PSSs means that the 
activities and processes of provider and customer become increasingly integrated which has 
also been described as a service ladder (Neely et al., 2011) or transformation staircase 
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(House of Commons Defence Committee, 2009). Processes relate to information sharing, 
planning and undertaking of the activities to deliver the availability of a range of products 
(Tukker, 2004; Neely et al., 2011). The higher the level of integration, the more activities and 
processes are necessary to provide and obtain PSSs, i.e. the higher the service complexity. 
2.2 Capability development for PSS delivery  
A capability is the ability of an organisation to perform coordinated activities utilising 
resources to achieve a goal and to purposefully create, extend or modify its resource base 
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). As such, it refers to the ability to deploy resources or transfer 
input into desirable outputs (Menguc et al., 2014). In this context, resources refer to both 
tangible entities such as raw materials or equipment and intangible entities such as tacit 
knowledge which can be embodied by knowledge workers such as service engineers 
(Henard and McFadyen, 2012). The transition towards PSS is an external stimulus, that 
arises through pressures from globalisation to reduce product prices and stay competitive. It 
can also arise from internal stimuli with PSS providers to aim for increase revenue, stabilise 
cash flow and improve the company’s market share (Baines et al., 2009). To provide and 
receive PSSs, organisations need to restructure their product-service delivery, including the 
formation and management of new contractual and relational capabilities. 
Contractual capabilities refer to an organisation’s ability to write, negotiate, monitor 
and enforce contracts (Argyres and Mayer, 2007). They ensure the implementation of the 
contractual agreement with regards to the recognition of contingencies to ensure an 
effective and efficient service delivery. Contractual safeguards and rules are established to 
minimise cost and performance losses from relationship hazards (Joskow, 1988). The aim is 
to protect the own organisation from opportunistic behaviour of the cooperating partner, to 
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reduce uncertainties and to specify roles and responsibilities of partnering organisations by 
relying upon legal rules, standards and remedies (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999). As such, 
contracts are important planning and incentivisation tools particularly for long-term 
business relationships (Deakin et al., 1997) as they form the legally enforceable instrument 
and control mechanisms (Williamson, 1985). Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa (2005) argue that 
formal control through contracts depends on three underlining conditions – codification, 
monitoring and safeguards - which are seldom met in an inter-organisational relationship. In 
practice it is rarely visible or practical to write complete contracts because of the complex 
nature of product-service offerings, asymmetric information situations andsubstantial costs 
and time efforts (Lyons and Mehta, 1997). Inter-organisational relationships are mostly 
governed by incomplete contracts characterised by some degree of uncertainty that makes 
these contracts unenforceable in their entirety (Roehrich and Lewis, 2010). Gaps in the 
existing contract are filled when contingencies arise, allowing some degree of flexibility to 
deal with unforeseen contingencies (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). 
To manage these gaps or incompleteness of contracts, relational capabilities are 
important tools to ensure a successful business relationship in practice. Relational 
capabilities are an organisation’s ability to perform in and benefit from inter-organisational 
relationships (Srivastava et al., 2001; Bititci et al., 2003). In other words, relationally capable 
organisations focus on creating relationship-specific assets and effectively create, exchange 
and exploit knowledge and skills through the application of social routines and behaviour 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). This form of capability is derived from values and processes in the 
exchange relationship (Macneil, 1980) and incorporates: trust and commitment, relational 
capital, information sharing routines and informal exchange (Lui and Ngo, 2004). Any 
unforeseeable contingencies in these relationships are safeguarded by flexibility, fostering a 
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joint approach to solving problems and disagreements through solidarity and information 
sharing (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). One of the most important aspects to develop relational 
capability is the establishment and maintenance of inter-personal and inter-organisational 
trust (Lui, 2009). Building up relational capital between partering organisations or 
individuals from collaborative firms is vital to deliver PSSs. Thus, relational capabilities 
complement contractual capabilities to address conflict resoltion quickly and to mitigate 
adversarial behaviour (Carey et al., 2011). Despite the importance of relational capabilities 
for strategic decision making in servitized manufacturers, the insights in this area are still in 
their infancy, especially when considering different PSS offerings and varying levels of 
service complexity (Newbert, 2007).  
2.3 Capability development for service complexity 
Relating the development of contractual and relational capabilities in PSS relationships to 
the issue of service complexity, we expect to see differences depending on the level of 
service complexity. Based on the literature, we expect that higher levels of service 
complexity will need to be supported by a higher level of both contractual and relational 
capabilities in order to coordinate between the PSS provider and its customers. In other 
words, we expect our case charaterised by higher service complexity to show a higher 
number of contractual arrangements in the form of a longer and more detailed contract, 
consisting of more paragraphs and clauses to safeguard against possible future 
contingencies and to mitigate potential opportunistic behavious. We further expect the 
agreement of higher service complexity to be characterised by a higher level of interaction 
between PSS provider and customer. 
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3. Research method 
3.1 Research approach and case selection 
To investigate the research question: What is the impact of service complexity on (i) 
contractual capabilities and (ii) relational capabilities when providing and receiving PSSs?, 
we adopted a multiple case study method. Despite the issue of generalisability, case studies 
offer the ideal research method for investigating our research question for the following 
reasons. Servitization is a very context-specific issue, meaning that company- and 
relationship-specific issues need to be included in the analysis. Thus, case-study research is a 
suitable method to gather practical insights into the issue by collecting rich primary and 
secondary datasets (Flyvbjerg, 2006). An in-depth discussion of exemplar cases offers the 
opportunity to identify the empirical evidence needed to improve understanding 
(Siggelkow, 2007). In addition, the investigation of one solution provider offered the 
advantage of selecting a polar extreme in the field, hence offering guidance and new 
insights (Eisenhardt, 1989). Especially for research in servitization, case studies are a 
suitable method to analyse the researched issues in-depth based on empirical observations 
(Kreye et al., 2013). 
We present two case studies of different levels of service complexity within one 
provider to gather an in-depth understanding of the issue (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). Studying 
one provider is appropriate in our context as different levels of service complexity can pose 
varying levels of difficulty to different companies, depending on their experience and 
capabilities. Focusing on one provider mitigates this challenge, but offers deep insights into 
the impact of service complexity on capabilities. Our case company, which we label ‘PSS 
provider’, operates within the European healthcare industry and offers support services for 
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their equipment. The company’s service offerings can be categorised into three levels of 
service complexity. These three levels are described in Table 1. To study the impact of 
service complexity on contractual and realtional capabilities, we purposefully selected two 
service agreements from the extremes of the service offering spectrum from the PSS 
provider. Thus, we selected an agreement from level 1 (case A) and an agreement from level 
3 (case B) for our analysis.  
<Please insert Table 1 about here> 
3.2 Data collection and analysis 
Our unit of analysis is the PSS, encompassing contractual and relational capability 
developments within two service agreements between the case company and two of their 
customers. The customers were hospitals providing different health services to private 
patients. In 2013, we conducted 25 semi-structured interviews with 21 interviewees both on 
the provider and customer sides to obtain insights from ‘both sides of the story’ (some of 
the interviewees from the PSS provider side were interviewed for both cases). Respondents 
were drawn from multiple functions, such as service managers, account managers, service 
engineers, strategic buyers and physicists. The respondents were chosen based on their 
involvement in the service agreements and stood in direct relationship with the customer(s) 
or PSS provider respectively. The differences in service complexity between both cases 
influenced the set-up of the relationship, as in case A, the customer hired first-line 
engineers to deal with initial repairs of the hospital’s equipment when possible. In contrast, 
in case B, first-line engineers did not exist as the PSS provider took full responsibility of 
these issues. Thus, the respondents for case A included first-line engineers, while the 
respondents for case B focused on equipment operators such as physicists. Further 
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discussions of the set-up of the service relationship is presented in section 4.3. Table 2 
depicts interviewees for both case studies. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
The interviews addressed retrospective and current activities of the service agreements. 
The interviews were semi-strcutred and followed a pre-defined protocol to ensure 
completeness and comparability between respondents and were complemented by 
individual spontaneous questions based on the interviewees’ individual discussions and 
comments. The questions focused on the following topics: the rationale for moving to PSS 
offerings, changes in the organisational strategy and structure, the development of the 
dyadic relationship and the importance and development of contractual and relational 
capabilities. Interviews lasted between 45 and 120 minutes and were tape-recorded and 
sub-sequently transcribed. Our data collection stopped when conceptual saturation was 
achieved. Data was triangulated to mitigate common method bias and improve validity and 
case study rigour (Lewis and Grimes, 1999).This included the service contracts, information 
on the tendering process, marketing material and other publicly available information such 
as announcements on webpages.  
We analysed the interview transcripts and the additional material, adopting 
systematic combining to inform our data analysis (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). We coded our 
data into major thematic categories informed by our research question and comprehensive 
literature review (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). More specifically, categories emerged from 
our theoretical framing while others were derived from our empirical data analysis. Our rich 
datasets were summarised and written up as case reports to be presented to the case 
company for verification. As part of our coding and analysis process, the authors travelled 
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back and forth between analysis, collection and extant studies, hence facilitating theory 
building (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
4. Findings 
Both contracts were based on a long-standing relationship between the PSS provider and 
two customers. However, interviews highlighted that this relationship changed driven by the 
shifts in the business context. We describe the context for the PSS relationship before 
highlighting findings with regards to contractual and relational capabilities. 
4.1 Contextual setting 
The investigated service contracts included support services for products that had been 
acquired by the respective customers before. In other words, the investigated service 
relationship focused on a context of asset specificity where the PSS provider and customer 
had previously been involved through the sales of the product, its installation and 
maintenance through a warranty period of one year. The customers in our cases were 
hospitals that offered healthcare services to patients. The acquisition process in the 
European healthcare sector had changed within the years before the data collection as it 
had been formalised in a European-wide tendering process. For the tender, the customer 
had to publish their requirements for the requested product and the communication 
between the customer and the competing PSS providers (i.e. bidders) was also formalised. 
This meant that any informal communications or exchanges were constraint by these 
tendering regulations. All of the submitted bids are evaluated objectively based on 
predefined and published criteria such as the price, fulfilment of the requirements, 
performance and workflow. Thus, the level of competition at the asset acquisition stage had 
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increased as more providers within Europe could participate in the tender. This was 
expressed by the service manager (PSS provider, both cases): “You have the tender business 
that means that everybody from the EU can go in and make an offer. We are all evaluated 
objectively.” This increased the complexity and length of the product acquisition process 
which meant that: “It tends to be quite substantive. The work load and so on. You almost 
need to have a legal department nowadays to handle these things” (Physicist 2, customer, 
case B). 
Once the product was acquired and installed, the customers were locked to the 
manufacturer for providing the support service. This meant that the PSS provider put a lot of 
effort into preparing competitive bids because “if you win, you win a lot. If you lose, you lose 
a lot. It is important to win because you can actually lose a whole region just in one tender” 
(Account manager, PSS provider, case B). Once the product sales were won, the customer 
had to rely on the PSS provider for the necessary support services. This simplified the 
negotiation of the service agreements as highlighted by the Service manager (PSS provider, 
both cases): “In fact, a lot of the service agreements we finalise by mail. I do not visit the 
customer anymore, we just send an email and they come back to me.”  
The cases we investigated focused on the relationship between PSS provider and 
customer once the asset specificity was in place and the customer locked to the 
manufacturer for providing the support service. This gave a clear context for the case 
studies and the service relationship between PSS provider and customer. In this context, the 
PSS provider described changes in the customers’ demands as highlighted by the Service 
manager (PSS provider, both cases): “The customer asked for higher uptime of the 
equipment use and then you could not live with the fact that the equipment can be down for 
1, 2 or 3 days. That could happen quite often if you do not do proper maintenance and if you 
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do not learn from the past and use this experience to develop solutions that would avoid 
downtime.” As such, the service components have become vital for the survival of European 
manufacturers in the healthcare industry. This means that the PSS providers have changed 
their offerings in accordance with the customer demand to secure additional revenue and 
secure customers. 
4.2 Contractual capabilities 
The contextual setting of our case studies with asset specificity and the locking to one 
manufacturer as the PSS provider simplified the contract negotiations for the support 
services. The agreement of contract-specific performance indicators was clearly stated from 
the outset of the tendering process.The Strategic buyer (Customer, Case A) highlighted: “It is 
the complexity of the equipment, their [the hospitals’] needs for uptime. During the EU 
tender, we have some requirements about different levels of service.” Thus, at the time of 
negotiating the service agreement, both PSS provider and customer had an idea about the 
service activities to be included in the agreement. This reduced efforts and time for the 
negotiation and the need of the PSS provider to develop contractual capabilities to deal with 
additional uncertainties introduced through the additional activities and their 
interdependencies of services with higher complexity. 
As such, we did not observe a higher level of contractual capabilities in terms of 
writing, negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts for the service agreement of higher 
service complexity (case B). This can be explained with the fact that both investigated cases 
were governed by contracts consisting of three pages with the following content: (i) a title 
page that listed the serviced product(s) with its specifications such as product type and 
model number; (ii) one page describing the service activities and (iii) one page of contract 
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specific information such as agreed response time, telephone numbers in case telephone 
support was part of the agreement, the contract date and the signatures of contractual 
partners. As such, only marginal differences could be found in the PSS provider’s contractual 
capabilities depending on the level of service complexity. 
One of the reasons for this similarity of contractual capabilities (apart from the 
contextual settings of the two cases with asset specificity and provider lock-in) might be the 
development of service modularity. The PSS provider listed their offered service activities 
for the customer to “pick and choose”. As such, contractual capabilities were developed 
both centrally and locally within the PSS provider. The business controller described this 
situation as follows: “We have two forces. We have what the customer and what the 
headquarter is telling us.” The definition of the service modularity was undertaken centrally 
within the PSS provider and the different modules are the same for each customer. 
However, the contract negotiation including issues such as the combination of different 
service modules and response times were negotiated locally with each customer 
individually, meeting customer’s needs. Table 3 gives an overview of the service modules 
included in the different levels of service complexity and optional add-ons. This modularity 
offered a very simple but also comprehensive list of service activities. During the tendering 
process, the customer publicised which service activities they would like to have included in 
the agreement. These were also modularised in form of six different service levels as 
clarified by the strategic buyer of Case B (customer); 
“Service level 1 - preventive maintenance without call-outs, Service level 2: error-correcting 
and remote service without call-outs, Service level 3: error-correcting service with uptime 
guarantee, Service level 4: full-coverage, Service level 5: full-coverage with continuous 
upgrading of software for state-of-the-Art, Service level 6: full-coverage with continuous 
upgrading of hardware for state-of-the-Art, Service level 7: cooperation.” 
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During the tendering process, the PSS provider could match the customer’s modularised 
service activities against their own modules to achieve a close match between demand and 
supply. The Service manager of the PSS provider (both cases) highlighted: “I then translate 
their service levels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and so on into our service level understanding of [levels 1, 2 
and 3]. That is important as I do not want the transparency to be too big. If they, for 
instance, have a [competitor’s] scanner I can directly compare and if it is not the same I put 
in more modules to match and exceed their [the competitor’s] service offering.” This 
statement highlights that despite the high level of regulations in the sector, strategic 
evaluations and contractual arrangements with the specific PSS providers are still important. 
The content of the service module with regards to for example frequency of the activities 
was further clarified in the Terms & Conditions (T&C). These T&C were enclosed with the 
service contract as an additional two pages and could be discussed further during the 
contract negotiations. However, as the Service manager highlighted (see quote in 4.1), these 
negotiations were often undertaken via email, face-to-face discussions were not necessary. 
The Service manager (PSS provider, both cases) stated: “As a result of the tender they 
[customers] have defined all the service levels. I do not have to tell them what those services 
are because they decided themselves.” 
<Please insert Table 3 about here> 
In summary, our assumption of higher levels of contractual capabilities for services of higher 
levels of complexity was not empirically supported across our investigated cases. We found 
that the contextual setting of asset specificity and the modularity of the service offerings 
countered the need to develop high levels of contractual capability. Another reason could 
be the high level of regulations within the European healthcare sector. These tight 
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regulations had legal implications by themselves as it prohibits specific opportunistic 
behaviour . This was explained by the Account manager (PSS provider, case B) as follows: 
“We cannot talk together. I cannot call the other company [a competitor] and say ‘Well, we 
don’t like this one going out in the summer. Why do not we all just ignore it?’ That’s illegal 
so not possible.” In other words, the legality of possible opportunistic behaviours both on 
the PSS provider and the customer side was mitigated by European regulations. This means 
that rules to mitigate opportunistic behaviour, one of the main reasons for contractual 
capabilities, do not need to be included in each individual contract. 
These findings illustrate that even though the contractual capabilities were not a 
distinguishing feature with regards to different levels of service complexity across the 
investigated case studies, they were still essential to ensure a high level of service quality to 
be delivered throughout the contract period. As such, the high level of joint understanding 
of service activities and the organisation of these in modules by both customers and PSS 
providers substituted the need to develop a high level of contractual capabilities. This 
ensured that occurring problems were addressed in a timely manner to avoid any escalation 
within the PSS provider-customer relationship.  
4.3 Relational capabilities 
Despite the high level of regulation within the healthcare sector, we found that relational 
capabilities were important across both cases. This was highlighted by the PSS provider: 
“We are all evaluated objectively. That means the relations are not there at all on the paper. 
But of course in the real world, there are some relations that are still working. But not as it 
used to be” (Service manager, PSS provider, both cases). The customer agreed to this 
evaluation as highlighted by Physicist 2 (Customer, case B): “Personally, I think it is 
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important that when you go out and you buy a new system, you are not allowed to take into 
consideration your previous experience. But of course somewhere, you always have that in 
the back of your head.” This highlights that the customer’s experience with PSS providers is 
an important influence on their decision during subsequent tendering processes. 
The PSS provider used primarily their service engineers to build a strong relationship, 
characterised by, for instance, increased information exchange. This was expressed by the 
Service manager (PSS provider, both cases): “For the service, relations are very important. 
(…) And these relations are built up over years by brilliant work of all the technicians. So it is 
very important that we have a good foundation from the customer services.” The customers 
echoed this importance of building up and maintaining relational capabilities particularly 
when managing the close relationship with service engineers. Customer A highlighted the 
importance of the availability of the service engineers when they are needed: “We can call 
them [the engineers] directly. (…) We can call them on weekends. And so they definitely 
provide a bigger service than we pay for” (First-line engineer, Customer, case A) and 
Customer B expressed the importance as the PSS provider’s engineers as a first line contact: 
“If you have a problem, you would call a technician. He will be here within half hour or an 
hour” (Physicist 2, Customer, case B).  
Our assumption of the initial framework was that more relational capability is 
needed for services characertised by higher complexity. This assumption was confirmed 
across the ivestigated cases. As such, the PSS provider utilised centrally defined procedures 
in connection with customer-specific experiences. In other words, service activities are 
defined as formal routines and procedures prescribing the customer interaction and are 
implemented through the specific service engineer and service manager based on the 
specific customer needs, skills and knowledge. Both parts of the service relationship – 
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centrally defined and locally implemented activities – define the PSS provider’s relational 
capabilities and depend on the level of service complexity. Case A (low service complexity) 
was characterised by four annual visits for preventative maintenance activities where the 
system was inspected and recommendations made. For these visits, appointments were 
agreed with the customer. “Then we go on site. And we have a protocol that we have to fill 
out. And we go step-by-step and perform all the things that need to be done” (Service 
Engineer, PSS provider, case A). This protocol is sent to the customer with a list of faults or 
recommendations for repairs and/or upgrades. “There is a common field that we could fill 
out. ‘We will recommend you do this and that.’ Or we can say ‘The system has this fault 
which we have to find a solution to’ because they have to pay for the spare parts. So it might 
be that they want to leave this fault and if it is not security or safety, then they can live with 
that” (Service Engineer, PSS provider, case A).  
In addition to the lower level of service complexity, the customer of case A employed 
own engineers for the first-line service activities. This meant that some repairs could be 
done by these engineers as highlighted by the first-line engineer (Customer, case A): 
“Because our knowledge of the scanners is very high, they can use us in instead of sending 
an engineer.” This strategic decision to keep some service capabilities insourced may in turn 
have influenced the customer’s acquisition of a service contract with a low level of service 
complexity; however, it also meant that the PSS provider needed to have low level of 
relational capability. 
In contrast, case B (high complexity) was characterised by a much closer relationship 
between the service engineers and the customer. In order to develop and maintain such 
close relationships, the PSS provider needed to build up strong relational capabilities. When 
the engineers are on site for the preventative maintenance inspections, they also consider 
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whether there are additional issues they could solve during their visit. Service Engineer 2 
(PSS provider, case B) explained “Before getting started, I will ask if they [customer] have 
any problems that they did not report to us. Sometimes they have a small problem that they 
think is not important. They write it in a notebook and they ask me.” In addition, the 
customer receives much closer attention even if they do not have any issues with the 
product. This was highlighted as follows: “But sometimes I am just going to the customer site 
and have a chat. To see if they have any problems or just to follow up on how it goes” 
(Service Engineer 2, PSS provider, case B). This point was also supported by Service Engineer 
1 from case B. This engineer had worked with the customer for more than 30 years and thus 
knew the site very well and had a very close relationship with them. 
“It is always nice to go there. Always when I go there, there are almost all the time some 
questions that I can look at. Maybe it is not my equipment but also something else, like a PC is 
not working or something else. It is like I am working in the hospital.(…) Many of them I know 
personally. Not privately but I have been so many time times they know me and I have 5 km to 
the hospital. So they just call me. They call me directly” (Service Engineer 1, PSS provider, case 
B). 
This high level of relational interaction between PSS provider and customer was confirmed 
by the customer of case B. Physicist 1 (Customer, case B) explained “I would say that our 
relationship with this technician is informal and it works fine for us. (…) I think it worked well 
if we have a problem we can call (PSS provider) and have a fast and efficient reaction.” 
Physicist 2 (Customer, case B) confirmed this: “The most important thing when you call them 
they react reasonably quick. They are typically here within an hour; so that is the main thing. 
And when they come here they solve the problem really fast.” This highlights that the 
customer perceived the relational capabilities in terms of providing high levels of service 
quality. They did not comment on the fact that the service engineers of the PSS provider 
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would sometimes be on site without being called in, but they focused mainly on their 
perception that when they did have a problem, it would be solved quickly and effectively. 
This suggests that high relational capability was translated by the customer into perceived 
service quality.  
This seemed to also add to the competitiveness of the PSS provider as the service 
quality, as perceived by the customer, gave them an advantage over competing PSS 
providers. The fact that local support was available and that they had a high level of 
relational capability already built up, gave the PSS provider a competitive advantage to 
other PSS providers within the European community. This was highlighted by one of the 
physicists as follows:  
“Some of the other manufacturers rely on support from [other European countries] and I think 
that might be a bit too far away in some cases, when you need to get things up and running 
quickly. And also the communication might not flow as easily. But that is a good thing with 
[the PSS provider]; they’ve got quite a huge, local department (…). That is an advantage” 
(Physicist 2, customer, case B). 
This development of high levels of relational capabilities was part of the operational 
strategy of the PSS provider. Building a close working relationship between the service 
engineers and the customer was emphasised as an important aspect that was crucial when, 
for example, selling additional services in the future.  
“When we have that [good relations], of course, it is much easier for me to approach the 
customer because they know our good service. And I do not have to present our organisation, I 
do not have to present our concept because they know it” (Service Manager, PSS provider, 
both cases). 
Including the relational capability in the operational and sales strategy of the PSS provider 
was particularly important for the contract with a high level of service quality. One of the 
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physicists of case B highlighted:  
“It’s nice to know that he’s not on the clock. So when he’s here, we can actually discuss things 
and maybe have a cup of coffee. If that wasn’t the case, we’d have to stand beside him and 
watch ‘is he working now and is he doing this fast?’ It’s more relaxed the other way. And then 
we get the time to discuss other things. (…)  I mean if we want to start something new, we can 
discuss it without worrying about spending [this money]” (Physicist 2, Customer, Case B). 
Thus, our case findings suggest that relational capabilities are influenced by service 
complexity: The agreements with low level of service complexity (case A) showed lower 
levels of relational capability development than the agreement with a high level of service 
complexity (case B). This is summarised in Table 4 depicting the relational capabilities for 
the two investigated cases. As such, the difference in the relational capabilities could be 
observed particularly in the identification of additional maintenenace activities and the 
relational capabilities for non-requested visits and discussions. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
5. Discussion 
The studied PSS provider showed high levels of contractual and relational capabilities that 
depended on the level of service complexity. We found that the PSS provider’s contractual 
capabilities, i.e. their ability to write, negotiate, monitor and enforce contracts (Argyres and 
Mayer, 2007), concluded in relatively short service contracts that included only three pages. 
This was influenced by their ability to define and implement service modules that guided 
the customer-specific negotiations. Furthermore, the PSS provider’s relational capabilities, 
i.e. their ability to perform in and benefit from their inter-organisational relationships 
(Srivastava et al., 2001; Bititci et al., 2003), included their visibility to the customer, the 
nature of the interaction (requested and non-requested service visits) and the character of 
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the information exchange (formal and informal). Table 5 summarises the results of both 
cases with reference to our initial expectations. 
<Please insert Table 5 about here> 
Our initial assumtpions were only partly confirmed through the investigated cases. Both 
cases illustrated that contractual capabilities did not differ to a high degree between the 
two levels of service complexity. Different possible reasons for this observation were 
described. First, the context of asset specificity and thus the link to one specific 
manufacturer as the service provider meant that the contracts were negotiated based on an 
existing relationship. Second, the high level of formalisation of the tendering process for 
the asset including an indication of required service activities meant that customer needs 
and the provider’s ability to meet these needs had been communicated and agreed at the 
time of product acquisition. Third, the modularity of the service activities both by the PSS 
provider and the customers ensured that the viewpoints were compatible and service 
activities could be mixed and matched according to individual needs and requirements. 
Fourth, the high level of regulation in the European healthcare sector meant that 
international legal bonds were established and respected by the industry. These regulations 
include possible opportunistic behaviours of PSS providers and customers which would 
otherwise be controled through contractual capabilities. Due to these reasons, we did not 
observe and increase of contractual capabilities by the PSS provider with increasing levels 
of service complexity. 
In contrast, relational capabilities were found to be an important mechanism and 
distinguishing feature for the investigated cases. We found that relational capabilities were 
dependent on the level of service complexity, especially with regard to the visibility of the 
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PSS provider on customer site, the nature of the interaction between PSS provider and 
customer and the nature of the information exchange. The investigated case of low service 
quality (case A) showed a lower visibility of the PSS provider on the customer site through 
less frequent visits, the nature of the interaction was purely based on requested service 
visits and the information exchange was through formal channels such as sharing the 
service report. In contrast, the investigated case of high service complexity (case B) was 
characterised by a higher level of visibility by the PSS provider on the customer site through 
more frequent visits, including requested and unrequested visits and the information 
exchange was often informal through discussions between the service engineers and 
product operators (physicists). We found that the level of relational capability was vital and 
influenced the perceived service quality by the customer which in turn impacted on the 
success of future sales.  
Prior studies further suggested that relational capabilities are a governance 
mechanism to create relational routines (Dyer and Singh, 1998), prevent conflicts and solve 
problems as well as exchange information (Carey et al., 2011). These insights were 
confirmed through our case studies as services with high relational capability were 
characterised by strong relational routines and a high level of frequent and regular 
information exchange between PSS provider and customer. In addition, we showed that a 
high level of relational capability can also be a mechanism to create competitive advantage 
as it creates a high level of perceived service quality for the customer through short 
response times and effective problem solving (Grönroos, 1984; Parasuraman et al., 1988). 
This was further found to influence the possibility of future sales both of the product and of 
future service agreements in the context of competitive bidding (Kreye et al., 2014). 
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The limitations of this research lie in the nature of case study research as we offered 
an in-depth analysis of a PSS provider and two of their customers. Thus our case findings are 
context specific for the European healthcare sector and for the presented servitized 
manufacturer (Siggelkow, 2007). Further research is needed such as additional case studies 
in different business and company contexts to triangulate the research findings (Lewis, 
1998). Business conditions in other industrial settings may differ significantly from the ones 
described in this paper which means that insights and conclusions may not be applicable. 
Similarly, different PSS providers may have a different understanding of their service 
business, particularly with regards to service modularization. As such, we demonstrated a 
successful PSS provider in their field and how their understanding of their service business 
influenced their contractual and relational capabilities for service provision. 
6. Conclusions and implications 
This paper described the relationship between service complexity and the development of 
contractual and relational capabilities within the buyer-supplier relationship for product-
service systems. We presented two industrial cases of one PSS provider and two of their 
customers, which differed in the level of service complexity. Our empirical study offers two 
distinct, but inter-related, contributions. First, we found that service complexity did not 
impact on the development of further contractual capabilities. Different reasons for this 
observations were found such as the modularity of the service offerings and requirements 
which allowed a simplified negotiation process with clear communications and joint 
understandings between PSS provider and customer. Second, our cases showed that 
increasing levels of service complexity increased the level of relational capability 
development between PSS provider and customer. Developing and mainting relational 
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capabilities can be considered a vital distinguishing feature for PSS relationships. In 
particular, we found that the visibility of the PSS provider on customer site increased with 
higher level of service complexity, that the nature of the interaction differed to include non-
requested research visits by the PSS provider to check-up on the customer and that the 
information exchange differed between a predominately formal communications via reports 
and standardised processes to informal communciations such as discussions over a cup of 
coffee. 
Thus, we contribute to extant literature by extending previous findings to the 
concept of service complexity and investigating the dyadic PSS relationship. This is 
important as manufacturing companies tend to increase the level of service complexity of 
their offerings when shifting to being a provider of PSSs. Our findings suggest that when 
realising a servitization shift, manufacturing companies need to improve particularly their 
relational capabilities such as establishing relational routines and behaviour, exchanging 
knowledge and information and building up inter-personal and inter-organisational trust. 
While developing contractual capabilities is important, it is the development of relational 
capabilities that can function as a distinguishing feature in PSS relationships.  
The research results have multiple implications for management practice. PSS typically 
increase the (relative) complexity of the service offering (cf. pre PSS arrangements) and 
therefore they require providers to develop and maintain additional service capabilities. For 
practitioners, this research clearly highlights that, in addition to getting better at ‘the service 
work’, they need to develop capabilities in two complementary directions. First, there is a 
need for relational capabilities to complement service capabilities, in particular at higher 
levels of service complexity, because enhanced relational capabilities improve the 
customer’s perception of service quality. This might include for instance, increasing the 
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visibility of the PSS provider on the customer site (e.g. through formal as well as informal 
service engineer visits) and/or improving the quality of provider/customer interactions (e.g. 
increasing levels of appropriate information exchange). Second, there is a need for 
contractual capabilities to complement the relational ones. Without such capabilities, PSS 
arrangements can lead to the creation of over-long contracts (i.e. extended lists of clauses 
and remedies) that are time-consuming and expensive to create and monitor, and typically 
ineffective. Contractual capabilities on the part of the provider can lead to the development 
of advanced forms of exchange governance (e.g. service modularity, influencing industry 
regulation to shape clear norms and joint understandings). In other words, the presence of 
contractual capabilities allow for the (relatively) simple governance of increased levels of 
service complexity. 
Our study paves the way for future research within the area of service complexity 
and service relationships. Future research needs to investigate the influences on the 
customer’s decision to purchase agreements of specific levels of service complexity. Such 
influences could be the customer’s strategic decisions to outsource specific capabilities but 
keep for example first-line services insourced or the customer’s perception of the product 
quality. Identifying these influences and their interconnections will yield insights for PSS 
providers to customise their offerings and target the individual needs of their customers. 
Future research further needs to investigate the development of contractual and relational 
capabilities in dependence on PSS complexity. Our study focused on service complexity after 
the asset had been purchased by the customer. Extending these insights to the purchase of 
the complete PSS including the product and its through-life support will yield important 
insights for management research and manufacturing companies. In particular, the 
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evolvement of the relational capabilities at the time of PSS purchase through formalised and 
regulated tendering processes offers an interesting area for further investigation.  
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Tables and Figures  
 
Table 1: Service offerings of the case study company 
Service level 
and 
complexity 
Preventitive 
maintenance 
Regular inspections 
depending on asset 
specifications to ensure 
safe and efficient 
operation. This included 
documentation, quality 
assurance, security and 
software inspections. 
Emergency support 
 
Emergency support via 
telephone and 
corrective maintenance 
activities. This included 
further regular updates 
of the equipment. 
Additional support 
 
Guaranteed availability 
of the product through 
delivery of spare parts 
and regular updates of 
the software systems to 
enhance productivity 
and availability 
Case 
1 - Low X - - Case A 
2 - Medium X X -  
3 - High X X X Case B 
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Table 2: Interviewees for both cases 
 Case A Case B 
Service complexity Low High 
PSS provider Both cases: 
• Service manager 
• Business controller 
• Invoice administrator 1 
• Invoice administrator 2 
• Sales manager 
• Service engineer 1 
• Service engineer 2 
• General manager 
• Sales manager 
• Account manager 
• Service engineer 1 
• Service engineer 2 
Customer • Service manager 
• First-line engineer 1 
• First-line engineer 2 
• First-line engineer 3 
• Strategic buyer 
• Chief physicist 
• Physicist 1 
• Physicist 2 
• Physicist 3 
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Table 3: Service modules as offered by PSS provider for the different levels of service 
complexity 
 Service level and level of 
complexity 
1 - low 2 – medium 3 - high 
Basic service 
modules 
Preventative maintenance X X X 
Quality insurance X X X 
Security inspections and support X X X 
Product upgrades X X X 
Telephone support  X X 
Emergency calls  X X 
Spare parts   X 
Guaranteed response time [hours] 8 4 4 
Additional 
options 
Software upgrades  O O 
Extended asset uptime  O O 
After office hour support  O O 
X – included in the service level agreement 
O – possibility for optional inclusion on service level agreement 
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Table 4: Relational capabilities for agreements of low and high service complexity 
 Low level of service complexity High level of service complexity 
Regular visits Preventative maintenance inspection 
visits as per product specifications 
Preventative maintenance inspection 
visits as per product specifications 
Additional 
maintenance 
activities 
Recommendation of additional 
maintenance activities such as repairs 
or replacements by service engineers 
of PSS provider 
Identification of additional service 
activities such as problems of asset 
operation through the customer 
Further relational 
capabilities 
- Additional non-requested, informal 
visits “to follow up how it goes” 
(Service Engineer 2, PSS provider, 
case B) 
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Table 5: Summary of findings of contractual and relational capabilities for contracts of 
different service complexities 
 Low level of service complexity High level of service complexity 
Contractual 
capability 
No difference for different level sof service complexity observed. The contractual 
arrangements were agreed on three pages including: 
• Title page with equipment specifications, 
• Modularity of offered service activities for the customer to choose, 
• Contract specific information including date and signatures. 
Relational 
capability  
Low level of relational capability for 
lower level of service complexity, 
evidenced by e.g. the following; 
• Lower visibility of the PSS provider 
on customer site, i.e. less frequent 
service visits. 
• Formal interaction only through 
requested service activities, such as 
additional repairs or replacements. 
• Information exchange mostly 
through formal channels such as 
service reports with 
recommendations 
High level of relational capabilities for 
higher levels of service complexity as 
evidenced by e.g. the following; 
• Higher visibility of the PSS provider 
on cusomer site, i.e. more frequent 
service visits. 
• Formal and informal Interaction 
through requested (e.g. repairs, 
replacements) and nonrequested 
service visits (such as discussions 
over a cup of coffee) 
• Information exchange mostly 
through informal channels such as 
discussions between service 
engineers and customer. 
 
 
